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On the trial of the validity of a challenge alleged against a juror, other than a
principal cause of challenge, a sound discretion is allowed to the court.
If a juror has formed or expressed an opinion in relation to a portion of tlhe
facts embraced in the issue, but not upon the whole i~sue, and, othelrwie, stands
indifferent between the parties, the allowance or refusal of the challenge is within
the discretion of the court.

MOTION' for leave to file a petition in error to the District Court
of Athens county.
cIeDivitt brought the original action in the Court of
Sophia M1.
Common Pleas of Athens county, against the plaintiff in error, on
the 4th day of October 1873, to recover damages, under sect. 7 of
the Act of 'May 1st 1854, entitled "An Act to prevent the evils
resulting from the sale of intoxicating liquor in the state of Ohio,"
as amended April 18th 1870, for injuries to her means of support
in consequence of the intoxication of her husband, Samuel S. McDivitt, a person in the habit of getting intoxicated, caused by the
defendant unlawfully selling to him intoxicating liquor on the 18th
of June 1873, and at sundry and divers times between that date
and the commencement of the suit.
The defendant, by his answer, among other things, joined issue
by denying that he had caused the plaintiff's husband to become
intoxicated by unlawfully selling to him intoxicating liquor, and
that the plaintiff had been injured in her means of support by reason
of any sale of liquor to her husband by him.
On impanelling ajury to try the cause, the regular jury was called,
whereupon it was made to appear to the court that, during the term,
a certain cause had been tried by the regular jury, wherein the said
Sophia 1. McDivitt was plaintiff, and Hickman & Hickman were
defendants, in which action the regular jury had returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff for injuries to her means of support caused
by the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors by said defendants,
which produced the intoxication of the plaintiff's said husband,
between the 21st of September 1872 and the 27th of September
1873. Whereupon the defendants challenged each and all of said
jurors for the cause aforesaid, which challenge the court overruled,
and defendant excepted.

DEW v. MclIVITT.
'lhrcu,on ..everal of said jurors,, being sworn, stated in substance

that %Ihile ,itting as jurors in I lickman's case, they had formed and
expres.ed the opinion, tlhat from the 18th of June to the 27th of
8eptvilbr 1873, the plaintiff was dependent upon her husband for
her means of support ; that during said period the plaintiff's h1sband had been in the habit of getting intoxicated, and that his
intoxic.t ion had impaired the plaintiff's means of support. (It also
appV;II.rcd that said juror.s had formed and expressed the opinion that
said 'ainuel McDivitt and the plaintiff were husband and wife, as
averred in the plaintiff's petition, which fact, however, was not
deied in the answer.) The defendant then challenged each of the
jurors who had formed and expressed an opinion, as above stated;
but the court. having interrogated each of said jurors, who answered
that the opinion so formed and expressed would not interfere with
their rendering an impartial verdict, on the issue joined, upon time
testimony which might be introduced in the case, overruled the
challenges respectively, to all of which defendant excepted.
The jurors so challenged were sworn and sat in the trial of the
cause and returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
A motion for a new trial was -overruled and judgment rendered
on the verdict. This judgment was afterward affirmed by the District Court.
Grosvenor & Dana and Desteigner& Jewett, for the motion.
IF?. R. Golden, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
MCILVAPNE, J.-The act relating to juries, passed April 26th
187., including original sect. 11, was in force at the date of the
trial below. It is not contended that a cause for a principal challenge, under sect. 11 of said act, existed. The ground of challenge,
if any existed, was for favor, under the following clause of the
section: "And any petit juror, who shall be returned for the
trial of any cause, and against whom no principal cause of challenge can be alleged, may nevertheless be challenged on suspicion
of prejudice against, or partiality for, either'party, or for want of a
competent knowledge of the English language, or any other cause
that may render him, at the time, an unsuitable juror, and the
validity of such challenges shall be determined by the court."
It appears to us that the jurors challenged in this case were shown
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to be indifferent between the parties, unless, upon tile facts disclosed
in the record, there was a suspicion of prejudice against tile deftrd:udice against the
ant. If, in a legal sense, a suspicion of' 1)r(

defendant was shown to exist, the court erred in refusing the challenges. A " prejudice,' which disqualifies a juror is usuall " souglit
for by the question, Have you formed or expressed an opinion in
this case ? The fact, which the question is intended to elicit. is
whether or not, upon the issue joined, the juror las formed or exIt is not enough that some matter relatingr to
pressed an opinion.
the issue, and necessarily involved in it, may be prejudged by an
opinion either formed or expressed, unless the court trying the
validity of the challenge should find that the opinion is such as
would disable the juror from delivering an impartial verdict upon
the evidence in the case.
As an illustration of this point, I put the ease of trespass quare
clausum fregit. The plea is "1Not guilty." 'ossession is an essential fact in the plaintiff's cause. Surely a juror, who had actual
knowledge of the possession, would not be disqualified. Again. an
illustration might be drawn from the practice in criminal cases,
where the discretion of the trier of the validity of a challenge for
favor is not so large. Thus, in a trial for murder, updn a plea of
not guilty, a juror would not necessarily be disqualified, although
he had personal knowledge of the death of the person alleged to
have been killed, and that the killing was murderous.
Notwithstanding, however, that great latitude of discretion must
be allowed to the court in the trial of a challenge for favor, as
there was at common law to the triers appointed for that purpose.
undoubtedly there is a limnit beyond which' sound discretion inav
not go; as, for instance, where it is shown that the juror has formed
or expressed an opinion upon the merits of the whole issue, and
the prejudice thus alleged is not clearly' rebutted'. The gcieral
rule, however, is that the decision of the trial court on all" challenges, other than principal challenges, and among the former is an
alleged " suspicion of prejudice," is final and conclusive.
I think it is a gieat mistake to suppose that our statute was intended to enlarge or extend the causes of challenges for favor, or
to narrow the discretion' of the trier of their validity ; and it' is
quite certain th'at the views above expressed are as liberal, in faivor
of challenges, as were the rules and decisions at common law.
Ever since the trial of Charles Cranbourne for high treason, in

DEW v. McDIVITT

1696, the rule at common law has been, that it is no ground of
challenge, that one of the panel has been on a former jury, which
convicted others upon the same indictment; because, as Mr. Chitty
has said (1 Clitty on Criminal Law 543), "every man must be
tried on the evidence of his own guilt, without reference to that of
his associates." In (ranbourne's case a juror was challenged because he was on a former jury which had convicted a prisoner
jointly indicted with the defendant, and it was held to be no ground
of challenge for cause: 13 State Trials 222.
The same rule is laid down in Hawkins.
Alyier v. The Steamer Maria, 14 Cal. 167, was an action for
damages against the defendant for negligence, by which sparks escaped from the chimney of the steamer while navigating Feather
river, and burned up a mile of plaintiff's fence along the river
bank. Among the jurors called were some who bad just passed
upon a similar ease, between other plaintiffs and same defendant,
for burning grain by the same negligent act. The jurors being
examined separately, were asked whether they had formed or
expressed an opinion. Several answered they had, if the facts were
the same as proven on the former trial ; but on being interrogated
by the court, they answered taft they had formed their opinion on
the other case. The challenge of the defendant for cause was not
allowed. This ruling of the trial court was approved by the
Supreme Court.
In The Commonwealth v. Hill, 4 Allen 591, the defendant was
indicted for maintaining a nuisance from the 18th of May 1860, to
the time of finding the indictment. The defendant had just been
convicted under another indictment for keeping and maintaining
the same building (described in the indictment), as a nuisance
down to the second "Mondayof Mlay 1860. A juror who had sat
on the former trial was challenged for cause. The challenge was
overruled, and the defendant, having been convicted, alleged exceptions. The exceptions ,were overruled by the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts.
Without, therefore, approving or disapproving the manner in
which the court below exercised its discretion in overruling the
challenges, we are unanimously of opinion that there was no error
Motion overruled.
for which the judgment can be reversed.
One of the niceties derived from the
common law, the reason for the existence of which appears to have ceased,

is the challenge to the favor. 1 Boavier's Law Dictionary 253, thus defines
it: "Those challenges to the poll for
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caue which are founded upon reasonable ground to suspect that the juror
will act under some undue influence or
prejudice, though the cause be not so
evident as to authorize a principal challenge."
So, ako, Arch. Crim. Practice 206 : "The cause of a principal
challenge to the poll.; is such matter as
carries with it, prinutfitcie, evident marks
of suepicion, either of malice or favor.
But when from circumstances it appears
probable that a juror may be biased in
favor of or against either party, and
yet such circumstances do not amount
to matter for a principal challenge, it
may be made a challenge to the favor."
Perhaps the best definition of this rather
indefinable distinction is to be found in
Solander v. The People, 2 Colorado 48
(1873) : "A preconceived opinion, if
fixed and determined, although not
characterized by malice or ill-will, has
been generally regarded as a ground of
principal challenge, while an opinion
based upon rumor, and which does not
appear to have taken firm hold of the
mind of the juror, has been regarded as
cause for challenge to the favor only."
To the same effect is State v. Howard,
17 N. H. 171 (1845).
The difference
between the principal challenge and to
the favor is, as may be gathered from
above definitions, extremely slight, and
seems to have arisen from the fact that,
as it required more or less evidence to
determine whether it were a ground of
challenge at all, triors, as they were
called, were chosen to decide the matter. Bouvier, supra, says : "Such challenges are, at common law, decided by
triors, and not by the court."
Now the practice of employing triors
has been abolished by statute, in most
of the states (though it seems still to
exist in England), the courts now determining all challenges. As this distinction appears to have been created
solely for the purpose of bringiug into
use the triors, it would seem that they
having been dispensed with, the distincVOL. XXVI. -79

tion betweden the principal challenge
and that to the favor should be abolished. Thus, Proffatt on Jury Trials
246, says: "This mode" (i. e., ciallenge to the favor) " is not favored.
It is in many places abolished, and the
arbitrary distinction must also become
obsolete. In the modern codes it is not
regarded, * * * and in a short time we
shall only read of it as a fanciful distinction of the common law." So,
Bishop on Criminal Procedure, sect.
906 : "In this country the distinction"
(i. e., between a principal challenge
and a challenge to the favor) "has not'
been much regarded, * * * though the
American law is not quite uniform, it
is the more general course in this country for the judge to hear all objections
which are made against jurors, and
decide them himself, without considering whether they are objections in the
nature of challenge for principal cause,
or challenge to the favor."
However, there are some recent cases
to the contrary effect. Thus, in &lander Y. The People, supra: "In modem
practice triors have not been called, and
the fact as well as the law has been
determined by the court,; but it is considered that this circumstance does not
furnish ground for disregarding the distinction between the principal cause of
challenge and challenge to the favor.
**
* The fact being ascertained by
triors, or by the court acting in the
place of triors, the law furnished the
conclusion."
So, in State v. Howard, supra: "The
fact that all challenges are here determined by the court, does not destroy
the distinction between principal challenges and challenges to the favor.
Upon a principal cause of challenge,
the court have only to inquire into the
truth of the facts alleged; upon a challenge to the favor, the court are to determine whether the juror stands indiferent."
So, in the syllabus to Boileau
v. Lifelasurance Co., 9 Phila. 218 : "A
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challenge to the favor is allowed in a
civil -uit."
The juror in a challenge to the favor
was examined on his roir (lire. This
is the
tual way of determining all
challenges. Now, triors being abolished,
the only distinction between a principal
chalLente anti a challenge to the favor
is done'away with ; and it is respectfully submitted that the courts should
ccase to regard it.
I In the principal case, the judge seeking to draw this subtle distinction has
himself fallen into error; as that which
he here adopts as a challenge to the
favor is in the text-books set down as
a principal challenge. Sec Proffatt 245.
The decision of the court in the principal case as to the eligibility of a juror
who sat on a former trial, is somewhat
similar to that in Smidth v. IT-zgonseller,
21 'enna. 491, in which the court say :
" that though it would be a good cause
for challenge, that a person called as a
juror had acted as such in another
cause between the same parties, involving the same questions and determined
on the same evidence, yet when the
seconl case is to be submitted upon different grounl, he is competent. It is
not to be presumed that any intelligent
juror would be affected by evidence
given in a former cause but not offered
in the one trying.'
Much more advanced ground is taken,

however, in lWiitner v. Hamlin, 12 Florida 18. There the court say, "that
after a juror has been regularly sworn
and impanelled, the fact he was a
juror previously in the same cause,
where there was a mis-trial, because
the jury could not agree, does not authorize or require his being set aside in
the second trial, when it does not appear that the juror is prejudiced, partial
or biased in regard to the matter or
question submitted to the jury, and this
in the judgment or discretion of the
court."
So in Atinson v. Allen, 12
Vt. 619: "The mere fact that a juryman sat in the qase, on a former trial,
or hadformed an opinion, if he had not
given a verdict, or in any other way
ezpressed -that opinion, constitutes no
sufficient ground of challenge."
These last two cases appear to be
entirely contrary to the current authorities. Thus, in Spear v. Spear, 1 Green
534 : "Jurors who reidered a verdict
against the defendants on an indictment,
are not competent jurors in an action
of trespass against the same defendants,
involving the same questions and in relation to the same subject-matter ; nor
are they rendered competent by declaring upon their voir dire that they have
not formed or expressed an opinion."
So, also, Soiuthwalte v. Tatum, 21 Ark.
336, and many others.
G. W. R.

United States Circuit Court, Southern District of New York.
CHRISTOPHER OSCANYAN v. THE WINCHESTER REPEATING
ARMS COMPANY.
The rule that a public office is a public trust, and that all agreements by a person holding such a station to control the business of the government for a pecuniary
consideration to himself, are void as against public policy, is not a local rule or
peculiar to tie law of this country, btt a principle of morality and of public policy
enforced in all countries having an organized system of law.
Such an agreement will not be enforced in the courts of this country though the
plaintiff relying on it is an officer only of a foreign government,, as to the law of
which in regard to such matters there is no evidence.
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The rule of public policy enforced in an action by a Turkish consul for commissions on a sale of fire-arms to another officer of the Turkish government.
An objection that a contract sought to be enforced in a court of justice is contra
bonos mores cannot be waived by the failure of the defendant to make it. Whenever the fact appeals the court will take notice and enforce it.

T is was an action of assumpsit to recover from the defendant
$136,000, commissions to the plaintiff for his services in effecting
the sale of fire-arms to the Turkish government, amounting in all
to $1,360,000.
The plaintiff's counsel, in his opening statement to the jury,
stated the facts upon which he relied, which ficts, it was conceded,
the plaintiff offered to prove, and claimed to be true. Assumingsuch facts as true, the defendant moved according to the practice in
this circuit, for a verdict for the defendant or for a dismissal of the
suit, upon the ground that the 4laintiff had no legal and valid cause
of action, upon his own showing.
Hermon .f. Shook, Richard O'Gorman and Theodore TV.

Dwight, for plaintiff.
-E. .

obinson and F. N. Bangs, for defendant.

The further facts appear in the opinion of
SHIPMAN, J.-The facts are as follows: The plaintiff, an Armenian Turk, who had long resided in this country, was consul-general
for the Ottoman government in the city of New York. The office
had no fixed salary, but the incumbent had the right to receive
certain fees for clearances of Turkish vessels, or vessels bound for
Turkey. The duties of the office were not stated, except so far as
can be inferred from the title. It is certain, however, that the plaintiff was in some sort the representative of the Turkish government
in this city, and was an acknowledged official of that empire. In
1869 the Turkish government sent Rustem Bey to this country to
purchase arms and ammunition, or to examine various arms, and
to report upon and recommend those which he should approve, to
the proper autlmrities in Turkey. Rustem Bey did not speak the
English language, but was acquainted with French. He was an old
acquaintance of the plaintiff, and while in this city made the plaintiff's
office his headquarters. As the plaintiff was well versed in the
English language, all the business pertaining to the selection of
arms was transacted by Rustem Bey through the plaintiff.
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The defendant was and is a corporation established in Connecticut for the manufacture of fire-arms, of which corporation Mr. 0.
F. Winchester was at the time of these transactions the president.
In 1870 the plaintiff and Mr. Winchester met, and the latter asked
the plaintiff to call Rustem Bey's attention to the defendant's repeating rifle. The plaintiff replied that he had a commission on
all business or sales which were effected through his instrumentality.
Winchester replied, "We will make that right, and agree upon the
amount," or words to that effect. The weapon was exhibited by
Mr. Oscanyan to Rustem Bey, who did not like it. The plaintiff
afterwards informed Mr. Winchester of this fact, but said that -he
thought he could induce Rustem Bey to include the Winchester arm
among other samples which he was to forward to Turkey. This was
done. On January 1st 1870, Rustem Bey received instructions
from the sultan to examine and report upon the Spencer rifle, an
arm which had been manufactured iH this country. The reason for
giving this order was, that the sultan had heard that a quantity of
these guns were owned by and were to be sold by the United States
government. The plaintiff thereupon used all his influence (which
is represented to have been great), with Rustem Bey to have the
Spencer gun discarded, and also used all his influence to have Rustem Bey examine the Winchester gun. The Turkish officer still
did not like the arm; but finally the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining
from him an order for a thousand guns. This order Rustem Bey
gave in order to please the plaintiff, who, he knew, was getting a
commission, and, furthermore, in his report condemned the Spencer
gun.
Mr. Winchester and the plaintiff subsequently met, and Mr.
Winchester was informed that the plaintiff had succeeded in getting
the Spencer gun to be condemned, to which- Winchester replied,
"Why did you do that? I could have furnished you commissions
upon sale of that gun." The plaintiff replied, "Why, the Turkish
government would have'bought of the United States government."
The Turkish governnent thereafter invited proposals for the sale
of twenty thousand Winchester rifles, and ordered Sresh samples.
Mr. Winchester was informed by the plaintiff of this direction, and
that he had got an order for twenty thousand guns, and could get
an order for one hundred thousand more.
An.agreement, dated March 4th 1870, contained the following
promise :
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"I hereby promise to pay to you a commission of (10) ten per
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cent. upon all sales of the arms of our company made to, or by you,
to the Ottoman government, provided only that such sale is made
at prices and upon terms that shall first have our approbation or be
authorized by us.
0. F. WINCHESTER,
President W. R. Arms Co.
P. S.-The commissions on the Spencer arms will be the same
as on our arms."
After some delays from various causes, in November 1870, a
written contract was entered into by the defendant with the Turkish government for arms to'the amount of $520,000, and on August
19th 1871, another contract was entered into for the purchase of
arms from the defendant to the amount of $840,000.
The plaintiff claims that the procuring cause of these contracts
was the recommendation of Rustem Bey, which recommendation
was obtained from him through the influence of the plaintiff.
The defendant's counsel now moves for a verdict upon the ground
that the alleged contract with the plaintiff for the payment of commissions to him upon sales made to the government of which he was
an officer and trusted adviser, by the exercise and through the
means of his great influence with the purchasing agent of that government, is void, as being a contract which is corrupt in itself, and
which is prohibited by morality and public policy.
The character of the services which the plaintiff rendered, and
the source or cause of their efficiency in obtaining for this arm the
favor of Rustem Bey, and the large orders of the Turkish government, have been so boldly and clearly stated by the plaintiff's counsel, that the case is freed from all disguise. The contract between
the plaintiff and the defendant was a purchase and sale of the plaintiff's official influence as an officer of the Turkish government, and
as the manager of the business transactions of Rustem Bey with the
American manufacturers, and the purchase and sale of the personal
influence of the plaintiff over Rustem Bey, who was a stranger to
our language ahd upon our soil, and the transaction was an active
and controlling exercise of the influence for the benefit of the defendant, in causing the rejection of arms the purchase of which, it was
supposed, would not accrue to the defendant's benefit, and in causing the purchase of the defendant's arms by the Turkish government.
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The plaintiff statcs, through his counsel, that he caused the rejection of the Spencer rifle, which the sultan was disposed to look upon
with favor, because the plaintiff supposed that the purchase of this
arm would be of no pecuniary benefit to the defendant, and that he
caused the purchase of the Winchester rifle to an immense amount,
because lie was thereby hoping to earn large commissions, and because such a purchase would accrue greatly to the benefit of the
defendant. The benefit which would accrue to the government of
which lie was the commercial representative in this city, does not
seem to have entered into the considerations which influenced his
mind. It is true that the plaintiff was not the purchasing agent
of the Turkish government, but he was its agent, and one upon
whom the purchasing agent relied. HIe was a public officer of the
govermnent of Turkey. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, Mr. Justice SwAY NE remarks : "The theory of our government is that all public stations
are trusts, and that those clothed'with them are to be animated in
the discharge of their duties solely by considerations of right, justice
and the public good. They are never to descend to a lower plane."
I am not aware that Turkey has laid down any different rule for
the guidance of the persons whoM it has charged with the exercise
of public trusts upon foreign soil.
It is virtually conceded that if such a contract had been entered
into by an official of the United States in regard to commissions
upon the sale of supplies, which might be effected through his influence or exertions with our own government, whether that official
was the purchasing agent or not, slich a contract would be against
public policy. The concession of the counsel is also found in the
opinion in Tool Company v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45, in which 'Mr. Justice FIELD, says: "All agreements for pecuniAry considerations to
control the business operation of the government * * * are void as
against public policy, without reference to the question whether
improper means are contemplated or used in their execution. The
law looks to the general tendency of such agreements; and it
closes the door to temptation by refusing them recognition in any
of the courts of the country." But it is said that this is the law
to be observed by public officers inthis country, and to be administered by the courts of this country, and that it does not follow
that it is a rule which is to be enforced by our courts upon foreign
officers in regard to their dealings with foreign governments. The
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principle to which I have adverted in regard to contracts for the
use of official influence, is not found in a local statute; it is not
peculiar to this country; it is a princille of morality and of public
policy, enforced in all countries which have a thoroughly organized
system of law, and there is no presumption that it is contrary to
the law of Turkey.
Again, the contract was entered into in this city by a resident
of this city, with a citizen of Connecticut. "Matters bearing upon
the execution, the interpretation and the validity of a contract, are
determined by the law of the place where the contract is made.
Matters connected with its performance are regulated by the law
prevailing at the place of performance:" Scudder v. Union
National Bank, 1 Otto 406.
Furthermore, it is sought to be enforced in our courts. Not only
is it true that such a contract is against public policy, but its enforcement by a court of justice is against public policy. Quoting
again from the opinion of Mr. Justice SW.AYNE, in Trist v. Child:
"It is a rule of the common law of universal application, that
where a contract, express or implied, is tainted with either of the
vices last named" (i. e. because it is contrary to a constitution or
statute or inconsistent with sound policy or good morals) "as to
the consideration or the thing to be done, no alleged right founded
upon it can be enforced in a court of justice."
It is not material that the plaintiff was permitted to enter into
mercantile business by his government, ndr is it material that his
office was not a salaried one, or that Rustem Bey was aware that
the plaintiff was acting in the expectation of commissions. Rustern Bey was not authorized to condone any acts of the plaintiff.
Neither do I think it important that the Turkish government was
aware that the plaintiff was in the receipt of commissions; for, as
has been said, the courts of this country are not organized to enforce contracts, which are repugnant to the principle upon which
courts are founded.
It is strongly urged by the plaintiff that since the passage of
the act known as the Practice Act, approved June 1st 1872, 17
Stat. at Large, p. 197, and embodied in sections 914, 915 and
917 of the Revised Statutes of the United States, the pleadings in
civil causes in the Circuit and District Courts must conform
as near as may be to the pleadings existing at the time in like
causes in the courts of record of the state within such Circuit or
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District Court is held, and that by the Code of Procedure of the
state-of New York, the answer must set out specifically the grounds
of defence which arc relied upon, and that illegality of consideration must be specially set forth and that the alleged invalidity of
this contract is exclusively a matter of defence, and if neglected
or waived by the defendant, is not to be regarded by this court.
The plea in this case, being the general issue, was filed at the
October Term 1874.
Prior to the Act of June 1st 1872, the common-law system of
process and pleadings existed in this court, and immediately thereafter, as- a matter of fact, the system was not substantially and
materially changed. Common-law declarations were filed, and if
no objection was made thereto, the pleadings thereafter were conducted under the established common-law rules. - No authoritative
decision was rendered discountenancing such system of pleading,
until the case of Lewis v. Gould, decided in December 1875.
The present case was originally brought in a state court, and was
commenced by complaint. After it was removed to this court a
new declaration in assumpsit was filed, in accordance with the existing usage, and the plea of the general issue was filed. In the
case of Lewis v. Gould, 13 Blttchf. C. C. 216, it was held that
"1the oommon-law forms of pleading are no longer n~cessary in the
United States courts within the state of New York, nor are they
admissible except as they may be deemed to be substantially a
compliance with the requirements of the Code of Procedure of the
state as to pleadings." And in Bills v. Railroad Co., 13 Blatchf.
C. C. 227, it was also held that when a complaint had been put in
in the state court, and the action had been removed to this court,
no further pleadings on the part of the plaintiff were necessary.
At common law, prior 'to the new English rules passed about the
year 1833, the defendant could, under the general issue in an action
of assumpsit, safely rely upon the defence that the contract which
was sued upon was illegal in its inception : 1 Chitty on Pleading
476, 477; Gould's Pleadings 330, 332; Stephen on Pleading 162,
note; Young v. Black, 7 Cranch 565; Craigv. Missouri,4 Peters
410; Andrews v. Pond, 13 Id. 65; Wilt v. Ogden, 13 Johns. 56;
Jdson v. Weston, 7 Cowen 278 ; Young v. Rummell, 2 Hill 478.
If, under the decision of Lewis v. Gould, it should now be held
that the general issue was inadmissible, or, if admissible, it did not
permit the special matter of defence which is relied upon, yet the
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defendant, having pleaded without objection under a system which
was recognised as proper at the time when the plea was filed, should
lave the right to amend his plea, so as to have the benefit of a
defence which goes to the merits, and is not merely technical in its
character.
But the question in regard to the disposition of this case does
not depend upon rules of pleading. The plaintiff, in his opening
statement, stated the facts which he claimed to be true, and upon
which he should rely. It is not suggested that they were not stated
truthfully. These facts satisfy me that the contract was contra
bonos mores. Such an objection it is not possible for the defendant
to waive. If he undertakes to waive or to disregard it, the duty
of the court is still imperative not to enforce a contract which the
law regards as injurious to public morals and against public policy.
Courts are not open for the enforcement of such contracts, and will
not lend assistance for the recovery of claims founded thereon, and
it is immaterial whether the defendant has or has not formally taken
the objection. "The defence is allowed, not for the sake of the
defendant, but of the law itself. The principle is indispensable to
the purity of its administration. It will not enforce what it has
forbidden and denounced. The maxim, ex dolo malo non oritur
actio, is limited by no such qualification. The proposition to the
contrary strikes us as hardly worthy of serious refutation. Whenthe illegality appears, whether the evidence comes from one side or
-the other, the disclosure is fatal to the case. No consent of the
defendant can neutralize its effect. A stipulation in the most
solemn form to waive the objection would be tainted with the vice
of the original contract, and void for the same reasons. Wherever
the contamination reaches it destroys. The principle to be extracted from all the cases is, that the law will not lend its support
to a claim founded upon its violation :" 0oppell v. Hall, 7 Wall.
542.
Recurring now to the character of the contract, there is no conflict in regard to the important facts. Upon a given and ascertained
state of facts, the validity or invalidity of a coi'tract is a question
of law. There is nothing for the jury to pass upon. Upon the
validity of this contract I do not think that there is a discrepancy
between the law as expounded by the Court of Appeals of New
York, and by the United States Supreme Court. The cases of
Ikon v. Miitchell, 86 N. Y. 235, 682, and Cummins v. Barkalow,
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4 Keyes 514, are very far from validating such an agreement as
is here sued upon.
In view of the decision in Tool Co. v. Rorris, 2 Wall. 45, it is
not important to ascertain what the precise duties of Mr. Oscanyan,
as consul-general, were. By virtue of his office, and by virtue
of his position as an officer of the Turkish government here, and
through his acquaintance with Rustem Bey, the plaintiff held close
and confidential relations with this gentleman. Ile had an influence over him, and was trusted and esteemed, by him. The plaintiff is now seeking to obtain payment for the exercise of his influence over a purchasing agent, which resulted in procuring a contract to furnish supplies to the government of which both were
officers at the time of such contract. An agreement to pay for
such services being void, the plaintiff has no cause of action, and
the motion of the defendant is granted.

Supreme Court of Indiana.
SAMUEL AYRES

ET AL.. v.

DAVID HAYS

RT AL.

Where a purchaser of land finds a mortgage satisfied of record and on the faith
of that record and without actual notice of any mistake, pays his money; he takes
a title clear of the mortgage although it turns out that the entry of satisfaction
was a mistake which would be rectified between the parties.

THIS was a proceeding in the court below, by Samuel Ayres and
others, against the appellees, Michael George, David Hays and
Joseph Butcher, to foreclose a mortgage. The complaint alleged
that on the 22d of February 1873, the said Michael George executed his two promissory notes for $500 each, to one Joseph C.
Campbell, one payable one year, and the other two years after
date.
That on the same day the said George also executed to the said
Campbell a mortgage gn several tracts of land in Monroe county,
to secure the payment of said notes, which mortgage was duly
recorded in said Monroe county.
That on the 15th day of April 1873, the said Campbell assigned
the note first due to the plaintiffs. That after said last-named note
had been assigned to the plaintiffs, and after said mortgage had
been so recorded, to wit, on the 7th day of August 1873, the said
George conveyed a portion of the mortgaged lands to the defeld-
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ant Hays, and that afterwards, to wit, on the 9th- day of December
1873, the said George conveyed the residue of the lands so mortgaged to the defendant Butcher.
That on the 7th day of August 1873, the said Campbell, the
mortgagee, entered upon the margin of said record of said mortgage, in the proper recorder's office, and in the usual form, full and
complete satisfaction of said mortgage, without the knowledge or
consent of the plaintiffs. That said entry of satisfaction was
intended only to apply to and to discharge so much of the mortgage as related to the note last due, but by inadvertence and mistake, was made to apply to the entire mortgage.
That at the time of the entry of satisfaction, the defendants knew the note-which had been assigned to the plaintiffs, as above
stated, was still outstanding and unpaid, and that the said entry of
satisfaction was only intended to discharge so much of said mortgage as applied to said note last due, as above set forth.
Wherefore the plaintiffs demanded judgment on the note so
assigned to them, and the foreclosure of the mortgage as to all the
other defendants. The defendants answered in two paragraphs.
1. That the plaintiffs were an incorporated company, under the
laws of the state of Indiana, by the name and style of the Farmers'
Bank of Frankfort, Indiana.
2. The general denial..
The plaintiff replied in denial of the first paragraph of the
answer, and there was a trial by the court, resulting in a finding
against George for the amount of the note, with interest, and in
favor of the other defendants. The plaintiffs moved the court for
a new trial as to the defendants, Hays and Butcher, and that motion
being overruled, a judgment was rendered against George on the
note, but foreclosure of the mortgage was refused.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
J.-The only error assigned here is upon the overruling of the plaintiffs' motion for a new trial.
After the introduction of the note in suit and the record of such
mortgage, with the entry of satisfaction thereon, as referred to in
the complaint, in evidence, together with the deeds from George to
Hays and Butcher, respectively, Campbell, the mortgagee, was
introduced as a witness, and testified, in substance, that when he
entered satisfaction in the record of the mortgage, he only intended
to discharge so much of the mortgage as secured the note last due,
NIBDLACK,
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but by mistake he entered satisfaction of the mortgage in full, and
that such entry of satisfaction in full was without any authority
from the plaintiffs.
The defendant, Hays, then testified, that the mortgage record
was entered satisfied, when lie purchased a section of the mortgaged lands, as alleged in the deed to him, which had been read in
evidence. That lie employed an attorney to examine the title to
the lands purchased by him, who reported to him that said lands
were free from any encumbrance, and that the mortgage in question
was satisfied. That he would not buy the lands until he had had
the title examined, and that he had paid George the purchasemoney in full at the time of the purchase.
That he had purchased in good faith, relying on the entry of
satisfaction on the mortgage record, and without notice that the
note sued on was unpaid. That he supposed that the notes were
paid off, else the mortgage record would not have been entered
satisfied. The defendant, Butcher, tqstified, that at the time he
purchased the land described in the deed to him, the record of the
was entered, satisfied in full. That he examined the mortgage
record at the time, and found the mortgage satisfied, and that he
would not have purchased as he did if the mortgage had not been
satisfied. That lie had no notice at the time of his purchase that
the note sued on was unpaid. That he had purchased and paid for
his part of the mortgaged lands in good faith, relying on the satisfaction entered on the mortgage record. That he supposed the
notes were paid off, else the mortgage would not have been satisfied.
This, we think, is a fair synopsis of all the evidence given in the
cause. The appellants contend that on this evidence there ought
to have been a finding also against the defendants, Hays and
Butcher, and a foreclosure of the mortgage. - That from the evidence it is shown that in point of fact, .Campbell had no right to
discharge so much of the mortgage as was applicable to the note in
suit, and that having vo such authority or right, the entry of satisfaction as to that note was inoperative as against the appellants;
and did not release the lien of the mortgage on the mortgaged
lands in. the hands of. the appellees, Hays and Butcher, even conceding that they were purchasers, without* notice. The case of
Lapping v. -Duffey, 47 Ind. 51, is cited to sustain this position. In
that case Duffey executed a mortgage to McClurg to secure the
payment of six promissory notes. These notes were on the same
day sold and transferred by endorsement to the Ohio Insurance

AYRES v. HAYS.

Company. This company brought suit on the last four notes, and
obtained a judgment upon them and a foreclosure of the mortgage.
After there had been one full assignment of this judgment, and
another assignment of a portion of it, McClurg, without any express authority entered satisfaction of the mortgage on the proper
mortgage record. It was leld that this entry of satisfaction was
not binding on the assignees of that judgment of foreclosure, and
did not prevent them from enforcing their judgment against the
mortgaged premises. The reasons for so holding are not given at
much length in that case, but they are obvious to the most casual
reader of that opinion.
The judgment on the notes and for the foreclosure of the mortgage was notice to all the world that McClurg had parted with his
interest in those notes, and in so much of the mortgage, at least,
as was intended as a security for their judgment. All persons,
therefore, who became interested in the mortgaged premises, after the
6ntry of the judgment of foreclosure, were required to take notice
that McClurg had parted with his interest in the mortgage, so far
as it operated as a security for the satisfaction of that judgment.
We do not regard that case as conclusive upon the one at bar.
On the contrary, it seems to us that the notice resulting from
the proceeding and judgment of foreclosure, in that case constitutes
an important element of difference between the two cases. In
the case at bar there was -nothing on record when Hays. and
Butcher purchased the mortgaged property, indicating that Campbell had parted with the note in suit, or that it remained unpaid,
or that Campbell was not fully authorized to enter satisfaction of the
mortgage, or had made any mistake in such entry of satisfaction.
Nor does it appear from the evidence that either Hays or Butcher
had actual notice of any of the facts which are relied upon to attack
the binding force of Campbell's discharge of the mortgage.
Under these circumstances we cannot do otherwise than to consider both Hays and Butcher purchasers for a valuable consideration, and without notioe, and protected against any proceedings to
foreclose the mortgage. Some questions were reserved by the
appellants upon the admission of certain testimony, but the view
we have taken of the case in other respects, renders it unnecessary
that we should make any formal ruling upon them. We need only
say in general terms, in. conclusion, that we see no error in the
record.
Judgment affirmed.

KERM ,. KINGSBURY.

Supreme Court of
AMIELIA KERR

Er AL. v.

lichgan.

SOLOMON 0. KINGSBURY

ET AL.

Where one takes a renewal of a lease, having previous to doing so a right to
remove fixtures which lie had erected, lie does not lose this right by the renewal
nnle-s the terms of the lease are inconsistent with it. Alerritt v. Judd, 14 Cal.
59, and L,myhran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, disapproved.
A mortgagee of lands takes his mortgage with constructive notice of the rights
of octpants. 'Where, therefore, a mortgage was given while the mortgagor was
occupying the premises in partnership with a third person, and carrying on business
in Imildiogs erected thereon, and it turned out that in fact ihe lands had previously
been conveyed away by the mortgagor by a (tced not recorded, and that he and his
partner occupied under a lease from the real owner : Hield, that the mortgagee
took his mortgage with constructive notice of the partner's rights, and could not
hold tenant's fixtures as against a subsequent assignee of the partnership.

APPEAL from the Kent Circuit.
COOLrY, J. -The controversy in this case concerns certain buildings which are claimed by complainant under a real-estate mortgage,
given 'March 18th 1874, by defendant, Solomon 0. Kingsbury, to
the testator. The defendant Lyon, on the other hand, claims them
as tenant's fixtures, under a ledse of the lands mortgaged.
The facts appear to be that the defendant, S. 0. Kingsbury, on
the 25th day of January 1871, being then the owner of certain
premises situated on Calder and Almy streets, in the city of Grand
Rapids, leased the Calder street lots for" ten years from June 1st
1871, to John S. Long and Samuel P. Bennett, constituting the
copartnership of Long & Bennett, who took possession and occupied the same for the purposes of a coal and wood yard. The lease
contained a provision allowing the lessees thirty days, on its termination, for the removal of the buildings they might erect. June
1st 1872, a further lease of a portion of the Almy street lots was
made by Kingsbury to Long & Bennett, to terminate at the same
time with the other, aid containing a similar provision respecting
the removal of buildings.
In September 1873, S. 0. Kingsbury purchased of Long his
interest in the copartnership of Long & Bennett, and assumed his
place in the business, which was thereafter carried on in the name
of Kingsbury & Bennett. In February 1874, S. 0. Kingsbury conveyed all the lots on the two streets to Gaius P. Kingsbury. This
conveyance does not seem to have been understood by the parties
as a transfer to G. P. Kingsbury of anything more than the fee
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subject to the leases, and the business of Kingsbury & Bennett went
on as before. In March 1874, the deed to G. P. Kingsbury in the
meantime not having been recorded, S. 0. Kingsbury gave to
Henry A. Kerr, whom the complainants represent, the mortgage
under which they claim. In January 1876, G. P. Kingsbury gave
to Kingsbury & Bennett a new lehse of all the lots for five years
and five months. This would make.the lease terminate at the same
time as the former leases, and upon the face of the transaction no
reason appears for giving it, unless it was to obtain, for the purposes of the business the copartnershil was engaged in, the lots
on Almy street, which were not covered by the second lease.
The buildings, the right to which is in dispute in this case, had
all been put up as tenant's erections previous to the giving of the
Kerr mortgage, and were occupied by the copartnership of Kingsbury & Bennett for the purposes of their business at that time.
That firm subsequently became insolvent, and made an assignment
for the benefit of their creditors to the defendant Lyon, who undertook to, remove the buildings as personalty. It is not disputed that,
as between landlord and tenant, the buildings would in general
have been removable, but it is insisted that under the facts of this
case they are covered by the lien of the real-estate mortgage.
I. In brief, the claim on the part of the complainants is that,
when Kingsbury & Bennett, in January 1876, accepted from G.
P. Kingsbury a new lease, they in contempilation of law surrendered the existing leases, and not having asserted and exercised a
right to remove the erections made previously, they thereby abandoned them to their landlord, and could not assert or transfer to
any one else the right to remove them afterwards. This is the
principal question in the case.
The right of a tenant to remove the erections made by him in
furtherance of the purpose for which the premises were leased is
conceded. The principle which permits it is one of public policy,
and has its foundation in the interest whic4 society has that every
person shall be encouraged to make the most beneficial use of his
property that the circumstances will admit of. On the other hand,
the requirement that the tenant shall remove, during his term,
whatever he proposes to claim a right to remove at all, is based
upon a corresponding rule of public policy, for the protection of
the landlord, and which is that the tenant shall not be suffered,
after he has surrendered the premises, to enter upon and disturb
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the possession of the landlord or of a succeeding tenant, to remove
fixtures which he might and ought to have taken away before. A
regard for the succeeding interests is the only substantial reason
for the rule which requires the tenant to remove hi§ fixtures during
the term ; indeed, the law does not, in strictness, require of him that
he shall remove them during the term, but only before he surrenders possession, and during the time that he has a right to regard
himself as occupying in the character of tenant: Pastorv. Hobart,
2 East 88; Weston v. Woodcock, 7 M. & W. 14.
But why the right should be lost when the tenant, instead of
surrendering possession, takes a renewal of his lease, is not very
apparent. There is certainly no reason of public policy to sustain
such a doctrine; on the contrary, the reasons .which saved to the
tenant his right to the fixtures in the first place, are equally influential to save to him, on a renewal, whdt was unquestionably his
before. What could possibly be more absurd than a rule of law
which should, in effect, say to the tenant who is about to obtain a
renewal: "If you will be at the expense and trouble, and incur
the loss, of removing your erections during the term, and of afterwards bringing them back again, they shall be yours; otherwise
you will be deemed to abandon them to your landlord."
There are some authorities which lay down this doctrine. Merrit
v. Judd, 14 Cal. 59, is directly in point. That case is decided in
reliance upon previous decisions which do not appear to us to
warrant it. Fitzherbert v. Shaw, 1 H. B1. 258, was a case in
which ejectment having been brought against the tenant, he entered
into an agreement that judgment should be signed at a certain
time, with stay of execution for a period; and the decision that
the tenant could not afterwards remove fixtures was based upon the
agreement. Lyde v. Bussell, 1 B. & Ad. 394, only asserts the
general rule, that where the tenant surrenders possession without
removing his fixtures, he loses his right. Thrasher v. East Lon-.
don, 2 B. & C. 608, wadecided upon the construction of a covenant contained in the new lease, by which the tenant undertook to
repair the erections and buildings, and at the end of the term the
preiiiises so repaired, &c., to leave and yield. up, &c. Shepard v.
Spalding, 4 Mete. 416, has some apparent analogy to the present
case, but it is only apparent. There the tenant surrendered to his
landlord without removing the fixture in covenant, but undertook
to assert the right under a lease made several years afterwards, and
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which he took when he was as much a stranger to the premises as
if he had never occupied them. It is manifest that none of these
cases affords. any support to the conclusion in Merrit v. Judd.
And we have been unable to discover in Landon v. Platt,34 Conn.
517; Davi8 v. tMoss, 38 Penna. St. 346, or Hofligh v. Stober, 11
Ohio (N. S.) 482, to which our attention has been called in this
case, anything important to this discussion.
The case of Loughran v. Ross, 45 N. Y. 792, is in accord with
the case in California. In that case Mr. Justice ALLEN, speaking
for the majority of the court, says: "In reason and principle the
acceptance of a lease of the premises, including the buildings,
without any reservation of right, or mention of any claim to thd
building and fixtures, and occupation under the new lettering, are
equivalent to a surrender of the possession to the landlord at the
expiration of the first term. The tenant is in under a new tenancy,
and not under the old; and the rights which were exercised under
the former tenancy, and which were not claimed or exercised, are
abandoned as effectually as if the tenant had actually removed from
the premises, and after an interval of time, shorter or longer, had
taken another lease and returned to the premises." This is perfectly true if the second lease includes the buildings; but unless it
does so in terms or by necessary implication, it is begging the
whole question to assume that the lease included the buildings as
a part of the realty. In our opinion it ought not to be held -to
include them, unless from the lease itself an underitanding to that
effect is plainly inferable.
In Davis v. Moss, 38 Penna. St. 346, it is said by Mr. Justice
WOODWARD, that "if a tenant remain in possession after the expiration of his term, and perform all the conditions of the lease, it
amounts to a renewal of the lease from year to year, and, I take
it, he would be entitled to remove fixtures during the year." This,
in our opinion, is perfectly reasonable, and it is as applicable to
other tenancies as it is to those from year to year, which are implied
from mere permissive holding over.
II. It is further insisted on the part of the complainants that the
right of the assignee of Kingsbury & Bennett to claim the buildings
as fixtures, cannot be asserted as against the mortgage given to
Kerr, because the mortgagee had a right to assume, when he took
the mortgage, that Kingsbury, the mortgagor, occupied the premises as owner of the fee merely, and was conveying to him, by way
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of security, everything that as between mortgagor and mortgagee,
would pass as realty.
In other words, that the possession of
Kingsbry & Bennett was no notice to Kerr that rights in the
buildings were claimed by them as tenants.
It is true, as a general rule, that the possession of a grantor or
mortgagor is no notice to his grantee or mortgagee that he claims
aiiy rights in the premises as against the conveyance he gives:
Bloomer v. flcnderson, 8 Mich. 395; -auson v. Danbury'Bank,
15 Id. 487. But here Bennett, as well as.Kingsbury, was in
possession, and Bennett's rights could .not be taken away by any
act of Kingsbury's. As to Bennett, the buildings remained chattels, and it was the duty of Kerr to take notice of his rights. If
he had done so and made the necessary inquiries, he would have
ascertained that the buildings were personalty ; for they could not
be realty as to one interest and personalty as to another: Adams
v. Lee, 31 Mich. 440.
We think the decree below was correct, and it must be affirmed
with costs.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
REUBEN FARLING, AD3!'R.,

ETC.

v. A. J. CLEMMER

ET AL.

A contract to pay a sum named. in ten years, "1with interest annually at seven
per cent per annutn until paid," means that the interest is due and payable each
year.

ACTION to foreclose a mortgage: decree foi plaintiff; defendants'
appeal.
The note secured by the mortgage was in the following words:
"Ten years after date I promise to pay to the order of Mary B.
Farling, two thousand and one hundred dollars, value received,
with interest annually at seven per cent. per annum until paid.
Payable at Fort Plaine, Montgomery county, New York.
A. J. CLEMAIER."

lfonroe & HIerrick, for appellants.
Were the words " with seven per cent. per annum" used alone,
there could be no question as to the construiction of the contract.
No part of the interest would become due until the principal became
due. The same would unquestionably be true were "annually at
seven per cent." used alone. In Adairs v. Wright, 14 Iowa 22,

FARLING v. CLEMMER.

643

the language of the contract is "interest on the whole amount due
at ten per cent. anfiually to be paid." The court below gave judgment for amount of payments with interest at ten per cent. and its
decision was sustained.
In Patterson v. JlelNeely, 16 Ohio St. 348, the construction of
the word "annually" was directly presented and decided, the court
holding that it meant the same as " per annum," and in the same
case, or cases there referred to, it was held that inserting the word
"paid" between "interest" and "annually" was a material alteration, and avoided the contracf.
How does the addition of the words "per annum" after "with
interest annually at seven per cent." change the import of the note ?
Is not the legal effect precisely the same whether "per annum" is
used or not?
"Per cent." under the decision of our Supreme Court means
the same as "per cent. interest per annum." Bigly Co. v.e
ell, 28 Iowa 519.
The counsel for plaintiff insists that a meaning must be given to
every word and expression in the contract, that is, that tautology,
in the construction of the contract, must not be permitted, and that
if the court does not hold that the note in question requires the
interest to be paid each year, "annually," or "per annum," will
be surplusage. This is by no means a universal, nor in ordinary
contracts, a general rule, unless it is apparent from the whole contract that the parties intended to give a different meaning to the
words or expressions used. Especially is this the case where the
words, when used separately, in the same connection have the same
signification, as we have shown that "annually" and "per annum"
have in the note in question, were they used alone; and more especially is this the case, when, to give the expressions used, a different
construction would make a contract not favored by the law.
The court will never put such construction upon the language used
as will make a contract not favored by the law, unless the language
used unequivocally or expressly requires such construction. Presumptions will not be indulged in to raise such a contract. Interest
is not payable before the principal on which it accrues, unless there
is a special agreement to that effect, and such agreements are not
favored in law: French v. Kennedy, 7 Barb. 452 ; Fake v. -Eddy,
15 Wend. 76.
Such contracts are not implied in the absence of express stipula-
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tions: Aspinwal v. Blake, 25 Iowa 320; 1 Am. Law Cas., 5th
ed., 614.
If the agreement of the parties requires interest to be paid annually, then the interest when it becomes due draws interest, and it is
in the nature of compound interest. Interest in the nature of compound interest, or interest upon interest, is not favored by the courts.
There must be some provision which'unmistakably requires it:
.Foreman v. Foreman, 17 How. 255; Bander v. Bander, 5 Id.
41; 16 Barb. 514; Aspinwall v. Blake, 25 Iowa 320. It is never
allowable except in special cases: Connecticut v. Jackson, 1 Johns.
Ch. 13.
At common law no interest was recoverable. Interest is a mere
incident of the debt-not in fact such a part of the debt as will
enable it to draw interest even after the principal sum is due:
Aspinwall v. Blake, supra.
It is the experience of every lawyer, 'that parties in drawing
contracts, frequently, and even generally, use expressions of the
same signification for the sole purpose of rounding out sentences,
or for the purpose, not of giving a different meaning, but of making that which has already been expressed more emphatic. The
parties to the note in question evidently had both of these objects,
especially the former, in view.
It is the duty of the court to so construe contracts as to carry
out the intention of the parties. Where the language used is such
as to raise a doubt, the court will give to it a construction that will
make a contract favored by the law.
We have shown that "per cent." means in legal contemplation
the same as "per cent. per annum." "Wehave also shown that
"annually at seven per cent." means the same as "seven per cent.
per annum." Were the words "annually at seven per cent." used
alone, the law would add by implication, after "per cent." the words
"per annum." How then can the addition by the parties of words,'
which the law would iniply, if not expressed, change the contract?
George Wattson, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
BECK, J.-The only question presented iii the case is whether,
under the terms of the note, interest is payable annually. If the
language be so construed, plaintiff is entitled to a decree for interest
due, if not, there is nothing due upon the note, and plaintiff's peti-

